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NOTES AND COMMENTS
based upon abrogation of constitutional rights may be permanently
estopped ;36 this is true of criminal as well as civil actions.
37
From this review of the operation of the doctrine of estoppel to assert
unconstitutionality it is apparent that it is an equitable instrument, the
importance of which can best be expressed by a realization that a consti-
tutionally guaranteed right may be permanently lost through a failure to
act or by imprudent action at a critical time.
DUNCAN IAN MAcCALMAN.
Constitutional Law-Rule of Exclusion-Federal Injunction against
Federal Officer from Testifying in State Criminal Prosecution
In what will undoubtedly prove to be a landmark decision in the law
of search and seizure, the United States Supreme Court in a recent case,
Rea v. United States,' held by a five to four margin, that the equitable
power of the federal courts should extend to give relief under the fol-
lowing circumstances: Petitioner had been indicted in a federal district
court for the unlawful acquisition of marihuana in violation of federal
law.2 A federal agent had obtained the evidence under a search warrant
invalid under Rule 41 (c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure-
this rule states the necessary requisites for a valid federal search warrant.
Petitioner made a motion to suppress the evidence. The motion was
granted and the indictment was dismissed. Thereafter, the agent insti-
gated a state criminal action charging the petitioner with possesion of
marihuana in violation of New Mexico law.3 While awaiting trial in the
state court the petitioner filed a motion in the same federal court to enjoin
the federal agent from testifying in the state action with respect to the
narcotics obtained by him as a result of the invalid search warrant. The
district court denied the relief and the court of appeals affirmed. 4 On
writ of certiorari the United States Supreme Court reversed.
"' Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944) ; Sanderlin v. Smyth, 138 F. 2d
729 (4th Cir. 1943).
The constitutional right to move for the return of property illegally seized and
to object to evidence obtained may be impaired, if not lost, when not seasonably
asserted. United States v. Napela, 28 F. 2d 898 (N. D. N. Y. 1928).
The court has discretionary power and authority over the waiver. United States
ex rel Athanosopoulos v. Reid, 110 F. Supp. 200 (D. C. Cir. 1953).
In Cameron v. McDonald, 216 N. C. 712, 6 S. E. 497 (1940), the court said,
"A defendant may waive a constitutional as well as a statutory right, and this may
be done by express consent, by failure to assert it in apt time, or by conduct in-
consistent with a purpose to insist upon it." State v. Dunn, 159 N. C. 470, 74 S. E.
1014 (1912).
" Carruthers v. Reed. 102 F. 2d 933 (8th Cir. 1939).
1350 U. S. 214 (1956).2 Marihuana Tax Act, 50 STAT. 554 (1937), 26 U. S. C. § 2593 (a) (1952).3 N. M. STAT. ANN. § 71-636 (1941).
*Rea v. United States, 218 F. 2d 237 (10th Cir., 1954), cert. granted, 348 U. S.
958 (1955).
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The court of appeals held that the prohibition against the use of such
evidence is limited to federal trials and is applicable there only when it
was unlawfully obtained by federal officers. The court assumed, without
deciding, that the district court under its general equity power had the
authority to render the injunction, but as there was no abuse of discre-
tion, it should refuse to intervene and disrupt the delicate relationship
between the federal equitable power and the state judiciary in state crimi-
nal proceedings.
The Supreme Court, however, considered the problem from a dif-
ferent approach. The majority,5 speaking through Douglas, J., stated
that it was simply a case concerning "our supervisory powers over
federal law enforcement agencies," 6 and that the district court was "not
asked to enjoin state officials nor in any way to interfere with state
agencies in enforcement of state law." 7 The Supreme Court stated fur-
ther: "A federal agent has violated the federal Rules governing searches
and seizures-Rules prescribed by this Court and made effective after
submission to the Congress.... The power of the federal courts extends
to policing those requirements and making certain that they are ob-
served. . . . To enjoin the federal agent from testifying is merely to
enforce the federal Rules against those owing obedience to them."
Although the court stated that "we put all the constitutional ques-
tions to one side," reference to the constitutional background of the law
of search and seizure will provide a setting into which to place the prin-
cipal case.
The Fourth Amendment 0 to the Federal Constitution commands that
the right of the people to be secure in their homes, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.
However, as is true of most constitutional provisions on individual rights,
there is no suggestion in the Constitution itself as to the method of
enforcement of this abstract right." So, although the Constitution pro-
hibits unreasonable searches and seizures, it does not expressly bar the
admissibility of such unlawfully obtained evidence in criminal proceed-
ings.' 2 Even though a search is unquestionably "unreasonable" and
Justices Douglas, Frankfurter, Black, Reed and Clark.6 Rea v. United States, 350 U. S. 214, 217 (1956).
7 Id. at 216. 8 Id. at 217.0 Id. at 216.
"0 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." U. S. CoNsT. Amend. IV.
'x "Bills of Rights may be replete with promise of public beneficence, but they
remain curiously silent about how such promises are to be fulfilled." ZuRcIFE,
CONSTITUTIONAL TRENDS SINCE WORLD WAR II. 5 (1951).
"2 Shinyu Nero v. United States, 148 F. 2d 696, 699 (5th Cir., 1945), ccrt. denied,
326 U. S. 720 (1945) (dictum) ; WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183 (3d ed. 1940).
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therefore prohibited by the Constitution, nothing in the Constitution says
what the consequences shall be. And just as the matter of what consti-
tutes "unreasonable" search is left to judicial decision,'3 so the conse-
quences of such search when it does occur are left to judicial decision,
in the absence of legislative enactment.
In the federal courts, however, this evidence is excluded by virtue of
the now famous "exclusionary rule" which had its birth in 1914 in the
case of Weeks v. United States.14 The essence of the rule is that evi-
dence obtained by federal officers in contravention of the defendant's
Fourth Amendment right is inadmissible in federal criminal proceedings.
And Justice Black has said ". . . the federal exclusionary rule is not a
command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of
evidence which Congress might negate. . . ."-15 The soundness of the
position that the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal
search and seizure is not a command of the Constitution is confirmed by
the number of state courts which do not exclude the evidence despite the
similarity of the state and federal constitutions. 16
" "What is a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula
... and, regrettably, in our discipline we have no ready lit mus-paper test. The
recurring questions of the reasonableness of searches must find resolution in the
facts and circumstances of each case." Minton, J., United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U. S. 56, 63 (1950), citing Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S.
344, 357 (1930).
"The test of reasonableness cannot be stated in rigid and absolute terms."
Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145, 160 (1947).
" 232 U. S. 383 (1941). However, in an earlier case, Boyd v. United States,
116 U. S. 616 (1886), the Supreme Court held that compulsory production of pri-
vate books and papers is "compelling [the accused] to be a witness against him-
self, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, and is the
equivalent of a search and seizure-within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."
Id. at 634-635. Then eighteen years later, the Supreme Court returned to the old
rule, when it held in Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904), that private
papers were not rendered inadmissible though seized illegally. Ten years after the
Adams decision came Weeks which reaffirmed the doctrine in Boyd, by holding,
in a federal prosecution, where federal officers have obtained private documents by
illegal search and seizure, that it is a violation of the constitutional rights of the
defendants to introduce them into evidence.
Thus, it is more accurate to say that the rule of exclusion did not become
finalized until the Weeks decision.
"0 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 39-40 (1949) (concurring opinion). This
led the late Justice Rutledge to say in the dissenting opinion in the same case that
the Amendment without the exclusionary mandate "reduces the Fourth Amendment
to a form of words." He cites Justice Holmes in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U. S. 385, 392 (1920).
10 Every state has in its constitution a provision similar to the Fourth Amend-
ment. For a complete list of the states and their respective constitutional provisions,
see, Note 35 CORNELL L. Q. 625, n. 9 (1950).
However, language similar to that found in People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 24,
150 N. E. 585, 588 (1926) can be found in decisions of many state courts: "We
may not subject society to these dangers until the legislature has spoken with a
clearer voice."
On the other hand, some state decisions do speak of the exclusion as though
forced on them by their constitutions, e.g. People v. Stein, 265 Mich. 610, 251 N. W.
788 (1933).
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Note that the rule is only applicable to federal officers as the recipi-
ents of the illegally seized evidence. Such evidence procured by state
officers acting independently of federal authorities is admissible in federal
courts 1 Also, state courts have held that evidence unlawfully seized by
federal officers may be admitted in state prosecutions if not contrary to
state law.' s
The constitutional provision is broad enough in terms to cover searches
and seizures by any person whomsoever. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has declined to apply its exclusionary rule to obviously unlawful
searches by private persons.10
Furthermore, in Wolf v. Colorado,20 a six to three decision, the exact
holding was that in a prosecution in "a state court for a state crime the
Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence ob-
tained by an unreasonable search and seizure."'21 However, the Four-
teenth Amendment 22 does subject the power of a state over life, liberty,
and property to the requirements of due process of law. In 1937 Justice
Cardoza, speaking for the United States Supreme Court in Palko v.
Connecticut,23 held that this requirement of due process made applicable
to the states only such guarantees of the Bill of Rights as are "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty." And Justice Frankfurter concluded
in the Wolf case that the freedom protected by the Fourth Amendment
17In Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 475 (1921), it was stated that "The
Fourth Amendment's origin and history . . . show that it was intended as a re-
straint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a
limitation upon other than governmental agencies. . . ." So, it follows that (state)
police officers became mere private individuals under the Burdeau v. McDowell
notion and evidence they seized illegally became usable in federal courts. "The
restrictions of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Federal Constitution apply
only to Federal officers. The like restrictions in the State Constitutions apply only
to State officers." State v. Rebasti, 306 Mo. 336, 347, 267 S. W. 858, 861 (1924).
However, in Gambino v. United States, 275 U. S. 310 (1927) it was held that
evidence obtained through wrongful search and seizure by state officers who are
co-operating with federal officials must be excluded in prosecutions before the
federal courts. Hence, there arose the necessity of proving lack of co-operation
among the state and federal officials before such evidence could be introduced in
federal courts.
1" Commonwealth v. Colpo (1930), 98 Pa. Super 460, cert. denied, 282 U. S.
863 (1930).
10 See, Note, Admissibility in Federal Courts of Evidence Obtained Illegally by
State Authorities, 51 COL. L. Rv. 128 (1951). Also, for a complete collection of
state and federal cases, see 8 WIGoRE, EvIDENCE §§ 2183 and 2184 (3d ed. 1940).
20338 U. S. 25 (1949). Defendant, a doctor, was convicted of conspiring with
others to commit abortions. Police officers illegally searched defendant's office
and procured appointment books. Interrogation of patients followed and objection
was made to the introduction of the evidence as in violation of defendant's rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Upon writ of certiorari to the state court, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed the state court's conviction.
21 Id. at 33.
22 ... nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. U. S. CoNST. Amend. XIV § I.2 302 U. S. 319, 324 (1937).
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falls within the above definition of Justice Cardoza. He states that "the
security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which
is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is,
therefore, implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such en-
forceable against the state through the Due Process Clause." 24  Thus,
the Fourth Amendment is a limitation on state as well as federal action.
However, the decision in the Wolf case was not implemented by the
rule of exclusion as enunciated in the Weeks case and employed by the
federal courts. On the other hand, Justice Frankfurter stated that ex-
cluding the evidence is not the only means of protecting the right em-
bodied in the Fourth Amendment, and that the "ways of enforcing such
a basic right raised questions of a different order."25 Exclusion of ille-
gally obtained evidence is only one of several means of protecting the
right.2 6 By the Wolf case the Supreme Court demonstrated its unwill-
ingness to condemn states' reliance on other means as falling below mini-
mal standards of "due process of law" in order to protect the right.
Therefore, Justice Frankfurter concluded that "due process of law" does
not command the court or the states to exclude illegally obtained evidence
in state prosecutions for state crimes.
Justice Frankfurter seemed to imply in the Wolf case that legislation
by Congress might possibly negate the Weeks doctrine. Congress has
not as yet undertaken such legislation. Until this is done, or until the
Weeks case is overruled, neither of which appears to be likely, the exclu-
sionary rule will continue to be what some writers refer to as "judicial
legislation" because the question as to whether the Fourth Amendment
is a command to the courts to exclude the illegally seized evidence will
never be directly in issue.
In the appendix to the Wolf case, sixteen states are listed as follow-
ing the federal rule of exclusion. In a recent law review article it is
stated that subsequent to the Wolf decision two more states have adopted
the rule.27 North Carolina is one of a few states which has made the
rule statutory. 28
2 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27-28 (1949).2iId. at 28.
"For example, the state may dismiss the offending officer or prosecute him in
a criminal proceeding, and the federal government may prosecute the offending
officer under the Civil Rights Section of the United States Criminal Code. The
victim of an illegal search may, also, have an action for damages in tort against
the searching officer. Recently, a large verdict was sustained in a suit based in
part on illegal searches by state officers in Bucher v. Krause, 200 F. 2d 576 (7th
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U. S. 997 (1953) (Jurisdiction based on diversity of
citizenship).
See in this connection, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 30-32, n. 1 (1949), 18
U. S. C. §§ 241 and 242 (1952).27 Waite, Judges and the Crime Burden, 54 MicH. L. REv. 169 (1955)-Dela-
ware, see Richards v. Delaware, 45 Del. 573, 77 A. 2d 199 (1950), and California,
see People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P. 2d 905 (1955).
" Prior to 1937 North Carolina was not a proponent of the exclusionary rule.
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The next case to be considered in this complicated and confused area
of the law is Stefenelli v. Minard.29 This case was decided in 1951. The
plaintiffs, who were about to be convicted of bookmaking with the aid of
certain incriminating evidence which the state of New Jersey had ad-
mittedly obtained through unlawful search and seizure, relied on the
dictum of justice Frankfurter in the Wolf case to the effect that were
a state affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into privacy it
would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment. They
petitioned the federal district court in equity for suppression of this evi-
dence under the Civil Rights Act.30 By New Jersey law such evidence
is admissible.3 ' The petition was dismissed, the court of appeals affirmed,
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari and rendered an opinion with-
out deciding whether the complaint stated a cause of action.3 2  The
-Supreme Court, Justice Frankfurter delivering the opinion, stated that
federal courts should refuse to intervene in state criminal proceedings to
suppress the use of evidence when claimed to have been secured by un-
lawful search and seizure. And, although the Court adhered to the dictum
An unsuccessful attempt in that year to change the then existing law was made by
the legislature. That statute had to do with the method of issuing search warrants
and had a clause to the effect that no facts obtained by reason of a search warrant
failing to meet the statutory standard could be used as evidence in a trial of any
action. The court in State v. McGee, 214 N. C. 184, 198 S. E. 616 (1938), ruled
that the statute did not mention evidence seized with no warrant at all. Therefore,
such evidence was admissible. However, in 1951 an amendment was passed which
states that no facts discovered as evidence obtained without a legal search warrant
in the course of any search under conditions requiring the issuance of such warrant
shall be competent as evidence. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (1953). For a discus-
sion of this provision see, Note, 32 N. C. L. Rv. 114 (1953) ; Note, 30 N. C. L.
REv. 421 (1952) ; A Surveyof Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1951, 29
N. C. L. REv. 396 (1951). It should be noted that in the Appendix to Wolf v.
Colorado, note 22 stipra, North Carolina is listed as rejecting the rule. That was,
however, prior to the above mentioned amendment.
Two other states have legislation excluding evidence obtained by illegal search
and seizure. MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, §§ 5, 5A (1951) ; TEX. CODE Caum. Paoc. art.
727a (1941).2
- 342 U. S. 117 (1951).
'0 "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected any citizen
of the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress." R. S. § 1979 (1875), 42 U. S. C. § 1983
(1948).
3 State v. Black, 5 N. J. Misc. 48, 135 A. 685 (1926).
3 "This act has given rise to differences of application here. Such differences
inhere in the attempt to construe the remaining fragments of a comprehensive en-
actment, dismembered by partial repeal and invalidity, loosely and blindly drafted
in the first instance, and drawing on the whole Constitution itself for its scope and
meaning.., however, the Court's 'lodestar of adjudication has been that the statute'
should be construed so as to respect the proper balance between the States and the
federal goveinment in law enforcement. . . . Discretionary refusal to exercise
equitable power under the Act to interfere with State criminial proscution is one
of the devices we have sanctioned for preserving this balance." Stefenelli v. Minard,
342 U. S. 117, 121-122 (1951).
[Vol. 34
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of the Wolf case, upon which the petitioners based their case, they again
refused to extend the remedy of exclusion to the states. "At worst, the
evidence sought to be suppressed may provide the basis for conviction of
the petitioners in the New Jersey Courts. Such a conviction, we have
held would not deprive them of due process of law." (Citing the Wolf
case.) 33
So stood the law until the Rea decision. The constitutional necessity
of excluding unreasonably seized evidence from the trial of one whose
Fourth Amendment rights have been violated continues to be one of the
major areas of dispute in this important segment of the law. The argu-
ments upholding the rule and those attacking it have become clearly
defined. A chief reason usually set forth in favor of excluding illegally
obtained evidence is that such an exclusion, by removing the effect of the
evidence in court, deters the law enforcement officers from future illegal
searches and seizures.3 4 The proponents of the rule also assert that any
other method of upholding the constitutional right is inadequate.35 Still
another reason used in support of the rule is that to use the product of
the illegally seized evidence would be to lower the dignity of the courts
which are sworn to uphold the law.3 6
Some opponents of the exclusionary rule refer to it as "judicial sup-
pression of the truth.13 7 They pbint to the fact that its effect is to sup-
press incriminating evidence, which allows the guilty to go free. Taking
issue with the proponents of the rule, they argue that there are other
effective sanctions to protect the right of those illegally searched.38 It
is often asserted that it is the function of the legislature, rather than the
courts, to provide sanctions against illegal seizure.3 9
Thus far, the United States Supreme Court has refused to force the
exclusionary rule upon the states by interpreting the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to require the exclusion of evidence seized in contravention of the
Fourth Amendment. This is true although there seem to be implications
3Id. at 122.
"58 YALE L. J. 144, 152 (1948).
For example, in considering a tort action against the offending official as one
means of enforcing the right, Mr. Justice Murphy in a dissenting opinion in Wolf
v. Colorado, supra note 22 at 43, said: "A trespass action for damages is a venerable
means of securing reparation for unauthorized invasion of the home.., the measure
of damages is simply the extent of the injury to physical property. If the officer
searches with care, he can avoid all but nominal damages-a penny, or a dollar."
"See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 470 (1928).
See generally: Waite, Judges and the Crime Burden, 54 Micia. L. REy. 169(1955). The author is a strong opponent of the rule of exclusion. He places the
blame in part on the judges. "They deliberately restrict police efficiency in the
discovery of criminals. They exempt from punishment many criminals who are
discovered and whose guilt is evident." Id. at 169.
" See People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 24, 150 N. E. 585, 589 (1926) ; Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 30 (1949).
" Roberts v. People, 78 Colo. 555, 559-560, 243 Pac. 544, 545 (1926).
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to the contrary in the recent case of Irvine v. California.4 ° But, whatever
its implications, that case still leaves the adoption of the rule to the dis-
cretion of the states as does the principal case under consideration.
The problem which disturbs the dissent in the principal case, however,
is the majority's proposition that the court has "supervisory powers over
federal law enforcement agencies"' and that it rests its holding upon that
basis. At first blush this seems to be a dangerous encroachment by the
judiciary upon the executive branch of the government, which violates
our traditional concepts of a division of power among the three govern-
mental branches. Justice Harlan, writing the dissenting opinion,42 sees
no abuse of discretion in withholding the relief requested, and feels that,
in accommodating state and federal interests in criminal law enforcement,
the Supreme Court's past policy of allowing the state to be left free to
follow the federal exclusionary rule should not be disturbed. The dissent
found no basis on which to reconcile the Wolf and Stefenelli decisions
with the majority holding.
It is submitted, however, that there is both a sound legal and logical
basis for the majority decision. There is more fact than illusion to the
holding that the court is not disturbing the "delicate balance between
federal and state judicial systems" in this particular case. Although the
effect of the injunction, as the dissent notes, 43 is to stultify the proceed-
ings in the state court, there is, in fact, no injunction against either the
state officials or the state proceedings. If the state is able to procure
other evidence it is still left free to make its case out against the petitioner
by means of its own process. It is still free to invoke its rule which per-
mits the introduction of its evidence obtained in contravention of the
petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights. 44 The Wolf case allows this.
To withhold the injunction in the principal case would be to hark back
to the quaint little game played between state and federal officials during
the prohibition days, wherein federal officers got their convictions in
" 347 U. S. 128 (1954). This case was decided by a divided court, also. The
majority, Justices Jackson, Warren, Reed and Minton, state that now that the
Wolf doctrine is known to the states, they may wish to reconsider their rules of
evidence, but, that it would be an unwarranted use of federal power to upset state
convictions before the states have had adequate opportunity to adopt or reject the
exclusionary rule. Then Justice Clark, in a concurring opinion in the Irvine case
states that had he been on the court when the Wolf case was decided, he would
have applied the federal exclusionary rule; but he concurs simply because the Wolf
case is now the law. He also states: "Perhaps strict adherence to the tenor of that
decision [Wolf v. Colorado] may produce needed converts for its extinction." Id.
at 138.
" Rea v. United States, 350 U. S. 214, 217 (1956).
, Concurred in by Justices Reed, Burton, and Minton.
, ,... the state's case against petitioner appears to depend wholly on the evi-
dence in question; the injunction will operate quite as effectively, albeit indirectly,
to stultify the state prosecution as if it had been issued directly against New Mexico
or its officials." Rea v. United States at 219.
" State v. Dillon, 34 N. M. 366, 281 P. 474 (1929).
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state courts for state crimes because the evidence they had seized illegally
was inadmissible in the federal courts by reason of the exclusionary rule.
To deny the injunction in the principal case and allow the federal
officer to testify as to the illegally seized evidence would be to hold that
the act of an officer is lawful, not on account of the character of the act,
but on account of the particular court in which it is called in question.
Should the federal officer be able to bring his defendant to a state court,
and there have his lawless disregard of his official duty appraised as a
meritorious performance? The United States Supreme Court answers
this question in the negative.
The rationale of McNabb v. United States45 can support the court's
alleged "supervisory powers over federal law enforcement agencies. '46
Although that decision was based on a prosecution in the federal courts,
the gravamen of the holding was that the federal court should not con-
done any flagrant disregard of Acts of Congress which set forth the
duties of the federal law enforcement officers. The obligation of the
federal agent is to obey the rule. And in the words of the majority in
the principal case: "That policy is defeated if the federal agent can flout
them and use the fruits of his unlawful act either in federal or state
proceedings."
'47
This interesting question presents itself. What would be the result
if the Supreme Court granted certiorari to a case similar in all respects
to the principal one--except that no action is brought to enjoin the fed-
eral officer from testifying in a state court as to evidence procured as a
result of an unreasonable search and seizure? Upon authority of the
Wolf decision it seems that there could be an affirmance, since in the
Wolf case the narrow holding was that in a "state court for a state crime
the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence
obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure."' 48 -No distinction is
made there between state or federal officers. Yet, according to the result
of the case under consideration the federal court will enjoin a federal
officer from testifying in a state prosecution as to evidence obtained in
contravention of the Fourth Amendment. In other words, the outcome
of future litigation concerning the admission in a state criminal proceed-
ing of evidence illegally obtained by federal officers would seem to de-
pend upon whether the state criminal prosecution was concluded before
'-318 U. S. 332 (1943). Here, conviction of the defendants for the murder of
a federal internal revenue officer, upheld by the court of appeals, was reversed by
the Supreme Court. The basis for reversal was that evidence was obtained by
subjecting defendants to questioning while being held in custody without a hearing
before a United States Commissioner or judicial officer, as required by law. No
constitutional question was involved.
"' See note 6 supra.
"Rea v. United States, 350 U. S. 214, 218 (1956).
,' Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 33 (1949).
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the federal injunction could be issued. The dissent in the principal case
questions the wisdom of a decision which might present such a dilemma.
There appears to be merit to this argument.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court could conceivably depart from
its holding in the Wolf and Stefenelli cases and say that the requirements
of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment can only be met by
excluding the illegally seized evidence in a state prosecution. Of course,
in order to do so, the Supreme Court must first decide that excluding
the evidence is not simply a federal rule of evidence, but a command of
the Fourth Amendment to be enforced through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
Essentially, of course, the problem in the case under consideration
remains the same. It is the exclusionary rule. The United States Su-
preme Court contrived the rule. By way of dictum, the majority of the
court consider it simply a federal rule of evidence.49 The minority, on
the other band, deem it to be a command of the Fourth Amendment. 0
However, the court is unanimous in its desire to exclude the illegally
seized evidence in federal prosecutions. By enjoining the federal agent
in the principal case from testifying, they were able in an indirect manner
to force the rule upon the state of New Mexico as it appears that the
state's case cannot be made out without the evidence and testimony en-
joined. Therefore, the rule of exclusion lies in the background in the
principal case just as conspicuously as it lay in the foreground in the
Wolf and Stefenelli decisions. The dissent conceded the power of the
court to issue the injunction. Undoubtedly they possessed it.
Those who think it more important that criminals be convicted than
that persons be secure in their privacy will look with disapproval upon
the principal decision; those who think that already we suffer too much
invasion of privacy will look with favor upon the granting of this injunc-
tion. It is hoped that the influence of the latter group will prevail.
JULIUS J. WADE, JR.
"' "And though we have interpreted the Fourth Amendment to forbid the admis-
sion of such evidence, a different question would be presented if Congress under
its legislative powers were to pass a statute purporting to negate the Weeks doc-
trine. We would then be faced with the problem of the respect to be accorded the
legislative judgment on an issue as to which, in default of that judgment, we have
been forced to depend upon our own." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 33 (1949).
"0 I also reject any intimation that Congress could validly enact legislation
permitting the introduction in federal courts of evidence seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment ... Congress and this Court are, in my judgment, powerless
to permit the admission in federal courts of evidence seized in defiance of the Fourth
Amendment ....." Dissenting opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 48 (1949).
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